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Abstract 
The False Memory Archive is a unique art collection containing hundreds of false memory 
reports submitted by members of the general population. The current study aimed to analyse 
these reports. Specifically, we examined whether some of the memories reported in these 
submissions were better described as nonbelieved memories (NBMs). Furthermore, we 
investigated the reasons for why people decided that their memory was false and assessed the 
verification strategies that people used to validate their mental representation. Five hundred 
submissions were coded and more than half (53.4%) met the criteria for NBMs. Social feedback 
was the most frequently reported reason for reducing belief and asking family members was the 
most frequently mentioned memory verification strategy. Reports categorized as NBMs were 
more likely to include mention of memory verification strategies than were believed memories.  
 
Keywords: False Memory; Nonbelieved Memory; Memory Verification 
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General Audience Summary 
False memories or memories for events/details that were not experienced can occur to everyone. 
As part of an artwork called the False Memory Archive, the artist -Alasdair Hopwood- has been 
collecting false memory reports from the general population. People who submitted these reports 
were aware that these memories were false. We took a closer look at a random sample of these 
statements and found that the majority could be categorized as nonbelieved memories. 
Nonbelieved memories are memories for events of which people have reduced the belief that the 
event actually occurred. Furthermore, we found that such nonbelieved memories were mainly the 
result of other people telling the submitters that their memory was incorrect. Our results show 
that belief-memory dissociations are quite normal in the general population.  
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Nonbelieved Memories in The False Memory Archive 
Scientific discoveries frequently inspire artists to develop creative artwork. In the current 
paper, we do the reverse by presenting a scientific study that was inspired by art. We examined 
an artwork called the False Memory Archive developed by the London-based artist Alasdair 
Hopwood. The artwork contains a unique assemblage of vivid personal memories of events that 
the contributors -the general public- claim never happened. Our aim was to describe the reasons 
for why people decided that their memories might be false, and the verification strategies people 
use to validate their memories.  
When we retrieve a memory for an event, we generally also hold a strong belief that this 
event occurred. However, studies have revealed a counterintuitive class of memories for events 
where belief that the remembered event occurred is reduced or absent called nonbelieved 
memories (NBMs; for a review, see Otgaar, Scoboria, & Mazzoni, 2014). Despite retaining vivid 
mental representations of the event accompanied by feelings of re-experiencing, people report a 
reduction in the belief that the remembered event actually occurred. NBMs might have started 
out as false memories which are correctly rejected later, called refuted memories. However, 
NBMs can also be incorrectly rejected true memories, called disowned memories (Mazzoni, 
Scoboria, & Harvey, 2010).   
Submissions to the False Memory Archive formed part of an international art project. The 
artist, Alasdair Hopwood, was inspired by research demonstrating the malleability of memory. 
Based on this research, Hopwood worked in collaboration with several international memory 
researchers to develop a series of exhibitions that contain objects, text, videos, and photography, 
as well as a written collection of personal accounts of experiences that never occurred. One aim 
of the archive is to show the public how the past is constantly reconstructed which might lead to 
“humorous, obscure and uncomfortable things people have misremembered” (Hopwood, 
NONBELIEVED MEMORIES 
 
 
5 
http://www.falsememoryarchive.com). Visitors to the False Memory Archive exhibitions were 
invited to describe a memory of an event of which they now know never happened. As such, the 
False Memory Archive provides an ideal opportunity to analyze potential NBM reports from the 
general population. One key advantage of analyzing these memory reports is that individuals 
who contributed to the Archive were not aware that they were taking part in research. In most 
prior studies of false memories and NBMs, individuals have been aware and were compensated 
for their participation. Such awareness may have affected the information that these participants 
chose to provide. For example, participants might have been more willing to tell a story -true or 
false- than submitters of the False Memory Archive.  
In the current study, we analyzed reports submitted to the False Memory Archive. By 
gaining a better understanding of false memories and NBMs in the real world, we can help to 
advance theories of memory. Specifically, we examined whether the reports submitted to the 
archive referred to false memories and/or to NBMs, and examined the reasons that people 
provided as to why belief in these memories was retracted. 
Studies on Nonbelieved Memories 
In the first empirical study of NBMs, Mazzoni and colleagues (2010) found that 20% of 
those asked were able to retrieve a NBM. However, participants were explicitly cued to do so; a 
procedure that might lead to an overestimation of the frequency of NBMs in the general 
population. Scoboria and Talarico (2013) examined how frequently NBMs would occur without 
participants being directly cued to report them. In three studies, participants retrieved 
autobiographical experiences after which these were rated on belief in occurrence (i.e., truth 
value attributed to an event) and recollection. They found that 3% to 3.8% of participants 
reported autobiographical memories that scored higher on recollection than belief in occurrence 
which they classified as NBMs.  
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Besides retrospective accounts of naturally occurring NBMs (see also e.g., Brédart & 
Bouffier, 2016), researchers have also elicited NBMs experimentally. Otgaar, Scoboria, and 
Smeets (2013) falsely told children and adults that they experienced a childhood hot air balloon 
ride. During two interviews, a significant minority of participants (36%) indicated that they came 
to remember this (false) event. Crucially, after the last interview, participants were informed that 
the suggested event never actually occurred, and participants’ belief in the occurrence and their 
memory for the false event were measured.  Forty percent of those who reported remembering 
the false event claimed to have a NBM after the debriefing. 
Other studies have shown that NBMs can be experimentally created using a variety of 
methodologies including doctored video clips of fake actions (Clark, Nash, Fincham, & 
Mazzoni, 2012). When informed about the false actions, participants reported decreases in belief 
in occurrence while maintaining a strong sense of recollection. Although this study concentrated 
on inducing NBMs for false (non-performed) actions, studies have shown similar findings when 
challenging memories for true experienced events (e.g., Mazzoni, Clark, & Nash, 2014; Otgaar, 
Scoboria, Howe, Moldoveanu, & Smeets, 2016; Scoboria, Otgaar, & Mazzoni, 2018). Together, 
the research to date shows that NBMs are not uncommon in the general population and can be 
elicited and manipulated experimentally.  
Reasons to Reduce Belief 
Previous work has examined reasons why people decide to withdraw belief in the 
occurrence of remembered events. Mazzoni et al. (2010) identified three types of reasons. The 
first and most frequently mentioned reason involved other people telling the participants that the 
memory was incorrect. For example, a sibling might have stated that the event actually happened 
to another family member. The second category referred to events being too implausible to have 
actually happened (e.g., recalling seeing a living Dinosaur). The last category concerned 
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contradictory evidence regarding the memory such as discovering a photograph challenging 
whether a certain event was indeed experienced (see Scoboria, Boucher, & Mazzoni, 2014 for 
similar results).  
 Theoretically, research on the reasons for reducing belief in occurrence parallels 
strategies that people use to verify memories that have been brought into question (Wade & 
Garry, 2005; Wade, Nash, & Garry, 2014; Nash, Wade, Garry & Adelman, 2017). These studies 
indicate that people evaluate the costs and reliability when choosing how to verify personal 
memories and tend to prioritize lower cost (in terms of the effort required to pursue a memory 
verification strategy) over reliability when picking a strategy. In these studies, participants 
primarily reported that they would rely on other people to validate memories. The chief motive 
for gleaning information from others is that relying on other people is a relatively cheap and easy 
way to verify one’s memories. This might also clarify why social feedback is the primary reason 
why people reduce their belief in the occurrence of events. In contrast, receiving or finding 
nonsocial external evidence is less often reported as a verification strategy. Albeit a potentially 
more reliable source, searching for nonsocial external evidence such as legal documents or 
photographs requires more time and energy, making it less likely that people use this strategy 
and hence it is less likely to play a role in belief withdrawal.    
Method 
Sample 
 Hopwood has been collecting false memory submissions online (via 
https://www.arhopwood.com/fma) and in six European museums: [1] The Mead Gallery at the 
University of Warwick, UK; [2] the Talbot Rice Gallery at the University of Edinburgh, UK; [3] 
the Newlyn Art Gallery, UK; [4] The Exchange, UK; [5] The Freud Museum, London, UK; [5] 
Carroll/Fletcher London; and [6] the Schunck Museum, Heerlen, Netherlands). Parts of the work 
NONBELIEVED MEMORIES 
 
 
8 
have also been displayed at Warwick Arts Centre in the UK, ADM gallery in Singapore, and the 
French Cultural institute in Boston, US. Total visitors to events and exhibitions on the UK tour 
was 18191 visitors in 213 days of exhibition time. 
For the current study, we only analyzed English submissions that were collected from 
exhibitions in the UK and online. At the time of the current analysis, a total of 805 submissions 
had been collected. Contributors to the Archive received the same instructions, regardless of 
whether they were submitting online or in-person. Specifically, they were told:  
 “We are collecting false memories for a False Memory Archive. You can 
anonymously submit a false memory by using the form overleaf or by going to: 
falsememoryarchive.com. The false memory can be your own or it can belong 
to someone else.”  
Although the instructions were the same, the context was different. During the 
exhibitions, people received more information about the phenomenon of false memories 
than people who submitted their false memory report online.  
The accounts in the False Memory Archive vary dramatically, ranging from impossible 
memories of pre-birth experiences to possible memories of, for example, holidays. This 
collection lends itself perfectly to the study of NBMs because the submissions, according to the 
archive, follow a pattern that is linked to research on the reasons for why people reduce belief. 
Specifically, according to the website of the False Memory Archive (see 
https://www.falsememoryarchive.com/anthology): “a memory is described, only to be undone by 
evidence that the recollection is faulty or by a suspicion that the experience never actually 
occurred.” We were only interested in personal submissions and excluded submissions referring 
to other people’s memories. We randomly selected 500 submissions to code for our analyses. All 
coded responses are available on the Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/nk54r/). 
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Demographic information for those who submitted reports to the False Memory Archive is 
unknown. However, there are some general demographic data on people visiting museums made 
within the past year. In England, in 2017/2018, about half of the population (from all age-groups) 
visited a museum or gallery (age range 16-74; 48.1% of 16-24 year olds, 53.2% of 25-44 year 
olds, 52.3% of 45-64 year olds, 52.7% of 65-74 year olds; Statista, 2019).  American data show 
that most museum visitors are white and well-educated (Farrell & Medvedeva, 2010).  
Predictions 
Our predictions were as follows. We anticipated that the majority of false memory 
submissions could be categorized as nonbelieved memories. This prediction is based on the idea 
that if people submit a false memory, they are aware that they at some point believed that the 
memory was genuine and then at some point their belief that the event occurred was reduced. 
Also, in line with previous findings (Scoboria et al., 2015), we predicted that social feedback 
would be the most frequently reported category for why participants decided that their memory 
was false. Finally, based on previous work (Ost, 2017; Wade et al., 2014), we expected that 
asking family members would be the most reported memory verification strategy, and we 
explored whether previous categorizations of verification strategies fully captured the range of 
strategies present in the archive or whether previously undocumented memory verification 
strategies emerged. 
Coding   
  Submissions were coded using an adapted coding scheme based on Scoboria et al. 
(2017) and Ost (2017). The coding scheme contained three main components. First, the scheme 
described how to code reports on whether the submitter believed and/or recollected the event. 
Second, the scheme described how to code the reasons for why submitters reduced belief in the 
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occurrence of events. Finally, details were provided to judge the presence of memory verification 
strategies.  
More specifically, we first determined the extent to which each contributor appeared to 
believe and recollect the event described in the report. Categories were taken from Scoboria, 
Boucher et al. (2015), Scoboria et al. (2017), and Ost (2017), and some were slightly changed for 
the current investigation (i.e., we did not include all subcategories of social feedback from 
Scoboria et al.). Categories included (1) Judged memory, (2) Judged belief, (3) Explicit 
statement of having a memory, (4) Explicit statement of having no memory, (5) Explicit 
statement of having a belief in occurrence, (6) Explicit statement of having no belief in 
occurrence, and (7) Acceptance of Events. From these categories the quality of the submissions 
in terms of memory and belief in occurrence was inferred, forming the categories of (1) Non-
believed memory (NBM; stating memory, stating no belief in occurrence), (2) Believed memory 
(BM; stating memory, stating belief in occurrence), (3) Believed-not-remembered events (BNRs; 
stating no memory, stating belief in occurrence), and (4) Non-believed-not-remembered events 
(NBNRs; stating no memory, stating no belief in occurrence).  
The following guidelines were used to categorize submissions: an event was judged to be 
recollected (Judged memory = ‘Yes’) based on the presence of a positive and lack of negative 
memory statement about the event, as well as the coder’s general impression that the memory 
was associated with vivid recollection. Moreover, the coding of ‘acceptance’ was used as a 
guideline for when belief in occurrence was or was not present. The extent to which an event was 
accepted (to have occurred) was coded on a scale of outright rejection (0) to full acceptance (3). 
The status of the report was based on whether any reports were present regarding belief in 
occurrence, other information about the truth status, and the coder’s judgement. Reports were 
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defined as believed to have occurred if the acceptance score was 2 or higher on the scale. Table 1 
summarizes which combination of scores led to which memory-belief category.  
 
Table 1  
Memory-belief Cross-classifications  
 Judged memory: Yes (2) Judged memory: No (0) 
Acceptance of events: High (2/3) Believed memory (1) Believed-not-remembered event (3) 
Acceptance of events: Low (0/1) Nonbelieved memory (2) Non-believed-non-remembered event (4) 
 
 
In the second step of coding, we investigated the reduction or withdrawal of belief. Here 
only submissions coded as NBMs and NBNRs were considered, since these represent all 
submissions for which belief in occurrence decreased. The categories from Scoboria, Boucher et 
al. (2015) were included complemented by two additional categories – the ‘Change of Context’ 
and ‘Noticing Deterioration’ categories identified by Ost (2017). Thus, the categories coded for 
reasons for belief reduction were: (1) Social feedback [including the subcategories: a) being told 
the event did not occur, b) being told the event happened differently, c) being told that the event 
is impossible, d) being told the event happened to someone else, e) being told the event is 
unlikely, f) disconfirming non-verbal feedback, g) being told that the submitter was not present 
at the event, h) lack of corroboration, i) others unavailable (e.g., important other people are not 
available to confirm the event), j) the submitter was pressured by another/others to stop believing 
in the memory, k) another/others refused to discuss the event, l) other social feedback]; (2) Event 
plausibility [a) general event plausibility (refers to how objectively plausible the event is to 
happen in general, not taking into account information that applies only to the submitter 
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specifically), b) specific event plausibility (refers to reports by the submitters as to how plausible 
the event is for the submitter specifically, in his/ her life; e.g., if someone submitted a memory of 
fighting with a sibling, this report would be generally plausible. However, if the person who 
submitted this report did not have any siblings, then this event would not be plausible for this 
person specifically)]; (3) Alternative attributions [a) internal/ asleep, b) internal/awake, c) other 
mental state, d) external]; (4) General Beliefs about Memory [a) memory and age, b) about the 
integrity of memory, c) about the ongoing influence of memory]; (5) Internal memorial 
characteristics (qualities associated with the mental representation for the event); (6) Notions of 
self/others [a) memory is incompatible with self-image or image of others, b) memory is 
incompatible with image of others]; (7) External evidence [a) disconfirmatory evidence obtained, 
b) confirmatory evidence not obtained]; (8) Personal motivation to reduce belief for the memory;  
(9) Change of Context (refers to cases in which a change of social situation, location, or medical 
treatment induced a change in belief), (10) Noticing deterioration (refers to cases in which 
submitters realize that psychological treatment/counselling they are receiving is not leading to 
improvement, leading to a reduction in belief for memories discussed during therapy), (11) 
Other, and (12) No information regarding reasons for withdrawal of belief given (see Table 2 for 
definitions of each reason). The lack of explanation for why belief was retracted in some 
submissions created the need to include the final category; this is one important way in which the 
convenience sample in the False Memory Archive differs from studies of NBMs in which the 
method typically involves asking people to describe reasons for reducing belief. 
In the third step, the coding scheme developed by Ost (2017) and the categories reported 
by Wade and Garry (2005) were used to identify memory verification strategies that were 
mentioned in submissions. Additionally, a check of whether a verification attempt was reported 
in general was included before coding the subcategories. This was deemed necessary since not 
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all submitters reported attempting verification. Therefore, the following categories were 
included: (0) General verification, if yes: (1) Checking with family, (2) Checking with others, (3) 
Searching for additional cues, (4) Searching for physical evidence, and (5) Cognitive techniques 
(see Table 3 for definitions of each strategy).  
The second author coded the reports using this coding scheme. The full coding scheme 
including all details on coding definitions and categories, a list of abbreviations, and a list of the 
decision rules used are available on the Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/nk54r). A 
second rater coded the memory/belief quality of 50 reports. Interreliability was substantial: 
Cohen’s kappa = 0.69 (Landis & Koch, 1977).   
 
Table 2  
Reasons for Belief Withdrawal  
Reason for Belief Withdrawal Definition/ Explanation 
Social Feedback (SF) Exchanges with other people lead to 
invalidating information and this feedback is 
the reason to reject that the remembered 
events occurred 
SF1 Feedback that the remembered events did not 
occur 
SF2 Feedback that the remembered events 
happened differently 
SF3 Feedback that the remembered events are 
impossible 
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SF4 Feedback that the remembered event(s) 
happened to someone else 
SF5 Feedback that the occurrence of the 
remembered event(s) is unlikely 
SF6 Non-verbal disconfirming feedback that the 
memory might be false 
SF7 Feedback that the submitter was not present at 
the recollected event 
SF8 Feedback that the memory cannot be 
corroborated/ confirmed by others 
SF9 Other people important to the remembered 
event(s) are not available to give feedback 
SF10 The submitter was pressured by others to stop 
believing in the memory and starts to mistrust 
that person 
SF11 Others refuse to discuss the events with the 
submitter 
SF12 Other disconfirming social feedback was 
obtained 
General Event Plausibility The occurrence of the event(s) is not possible 
in general, not taking the specific position of 
the submitter into account 
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Specific Event Plausibility The occurrence of the event(s) is not possible 
for the submitter specifically, even if in 
general these events could have happened to 
someone else 
Alternative Attributions (AA) The recollection is allocated to an origin in a 
source other than real life experience 
AA1 Events attributed to internal, mental images 
while asleep (e.g., dreaming) 
AA2 Events attributed to an internal source while 
awake (e.g., imagination) 
AA3 Events attributed to fabrication while in 
another mental state (e.g., hallucination, 
intoxication, exhaustion) 
AA4 Events attributed to confusion between 
external sources and experiences (e.g., books, 
TV) 
General Beliefs (GB) Changed belief due to general beliefs about 
memory and memory ability 
GB1 Beliefs about memory during childhood (e.g., 
memory cannot occur before a certain age, 
childhood memories are unreliable) 
GB2 Beliefs about the integrity of memory (e.g., 
memory can be false) 
NONBELIEVED MEMORIES 
 
 
16 
GB3 Beliefs about influence of memory (e.g., 
memories should have an ongoing influence 
on behavior)  
Internal Features of Event Representation Internal features such as sensations, images, 
emotions are abnormal for a memory  
External Evidence (EE) Found external evidence (not from a social 
exchange) indicating that the recollected 
event(s) could not have occurred 
EE1 Evidence is found that disconfirms the 
memory events 
EE2 Evidence to confirm the memory cannot be 
found 
Notions of Self/ Other (NSO) Occurrence of event(s) is incompatible with 
submitter’s self-concept or image of another 
person 
NSO1 Occurrence of event(s) is incompatible with 
the submitter’s self-image 
NSO2 Occurrence of event(s) is incompatible with 
the submitter’s image of another person  
Personal Motivation Personal motivation to invalidate the 
recollection for some self-benefit  
Change of Context Change in belief due to change in social 
situation or location 
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Noticing Deterioration Change of belief after submitter noticed that 
treatment they are getting is not improving 
their condition, so that memories from during 
the treatment time are questioned 
Other  Belief is changed due to some other reason 
not listed above 
No information No information was given to indicate why 
belief was withdrawn  
 
 
Table 3 
Verification Strategies  
Verification Strategy  Explanation/ Definition  
General Attempt at verification  The submitter actively tried to verify their 
memory (e.g., by actively searching for more 
information) 
VS1 Asked family members whether details/ or the 
complete remembered event(s) are true 
VS2 Asked people other than family members 
whether details/ or the complete remembered 
event(s) are true (e.g., friends, acquaintances) 
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VS3 Sought out locations or cues to cue recall and 
verify their memory (e.g., returning to the 
event location) 
VS4 Searched for physical evidence compatible 
with the memory (e.g., scars, newspaper 
articles) 
VS5 Purposefully used cognitive techniques (e.g., 
trying to remember more of the event) to 
verify memory events  
 
Results 
Nonbelieved Memories  
As predicted, more than half of the submissions were categorized as nonbelieved 
memories (n = 267, 53.4%). An example of a NBM from the archive is: “I remember getting lost 
in a national park as a 6 year old child. I even remember the conversation with my parents. 
There was a hill, I said I'd go round one way and they'd go the other and we'd meet on the other 
side. Only when I reached the other side they weren't there […]. I was picked up by a park 
ranger, rode in the back of his open back truck. Was taken to a shop[…]. I remember hearing 
notice of a lost child going over the tannoy for my parents to come and pick me up, which they 
did. I remembered and believed all this for over 30 years until one day I asked my parents if they 
remember it. They both […] swore blind that it never happened. I believe them, they would 
definitely remember something like that […] I now believe I'd dreamt it.” 
A large percentage of the reports were coded as believed memories (n = 208, 41.6%). An 
example is the following: “When I was approximately 6 years old, I was visiting my older 
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cousin’s house. I recall brawling with him in his room with my older sister watching from the 
bunk bed. I then had both of my front teeth knocked out of my mouth. His mother then told me I 
would get £2 from the tooth fairy etc. and I placed my teeth near a sink, which they later fell 
down/went missing; and I was given £2. Later I was told by my parents they don’t remember it 
[…]. [My cousin and aunt do] not remember either. However, to this day I believe it’s real […]”. 
A minority of reports were coded as believed-not-remembered events (n = 11; 2.2%) or not-
believed-not-remembered events (n = 14, 2.8%).  
 
 
Figure 1. Reasons for Belief Reduction 
Reasons for Belief Reduction 
 To analyze the reasons for belief reduction, we focused on memory reports in which 
belief was reduced or relinquished and hence focused on nonbelieved memories or non-believed-
not-remembered events (n = 281). As expected, and consistent with Scoboria, Boucher and 
Mazzoni (2014) social feedback was the most frequently mentioned category (n = 94, 33.5%; see 
Figure 1). Also consistent with their study, within the social category being told that the event 
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did not occur was the most frequently mentioned sub-category, 44.7% (42/94); n = 42. For 
example, one individual wrote: “I can vividly remember attending a wedding, aged around 5, 
where there was a grape juice fountain built out of stone in the corridor. [...] I have always 
counted this as one of the weddings I had been to until a couple of years ago (aged about 25) my 
mum said it had never happened.”. 
Other reasons were the following (most to least frequent): Alternative attributions was 
stated as a reason in 19.6% (n = 55) of cases, specific event plausibility in 12.8% (n = 36) of 
cases, external evidence in 11% (n = 31) of cases, general event plausibility in 10.7% (n = 30) of 
cases, general beliefs in 2.8% (n = 8) of cases, internal features in 2.1% (n = 6) of cases, notions 
of self and others in 1.4% (n = 4) of cases, change in context in 0.1% (n = 2) of cases, and 
personal motivations in 0.4% (n = 1) of cases. Of those who reduced belief due to general beliefs 
(n = 8), 87.5% (n = 7 out of 8) did so because of general beliefs about the functioning of memory 
(e.g., “[...] I remember my mum bringing home my baby brother from [the] hospital when I was 
18 months old, and me prodding him in his baby basket. I remember it was in the living room 
and where he was placed on the floor, but I was too young to remember this happening [...]”) 
and 12.5% (n = 1 out of 8) due to general beliefs about memory integrity. 
 For some of the primary categories, several subcategories were identified. For example, 
for the alternative attributions category, 52.7% (n = 29 out of 55) of submitters indicated 
attributing the memory to an internal source while asleep (e.g., dreaming, “When I was about 10 
I had a memory of having my arm stitched at a local hospital [...]. Thinking about it, it must have 
been a very vivid dream that I confused with ”reality”) while 32.7% (n = 18) reduced belief 
because they attributed the memory to an external source (e.g., movie, photograph). Also, 14.5% 
(n = 8) viewed their memory as originating from an internal source while being awake (e.g., 
imagination, “[...] A little later one of the kids reported seeing someone in the woods near the 
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cabin. A teacher got into the minibus, put the headlights on and slowly drove towards the woods 
where this person had supposedly been. I remember walking alongside the minibus holding onto 
the wing-mirror. Suddenly a man in a Halloween mask jumped out from behind a tree 10 feet in 
front of me, screamed, then ran off. [...] I can only think now that I'd imagined [...] the whole 
thing”) and one person (1.8%) ascribed their memory to another mental state (intoxication).
 With regards to retracting a belief because of nonsocial external evidence, 83.9% (n = 26) 
did so because they received nonsocial external evidence disconfirming the authenticity of their 
memory (e.g. legal documents, pictures) and 16.1% (n = 5) of the people retracted belief because 
they failed to find any evidence confirming memory (e.g., lack of scars, “I thought I remembered 
putting a garden fork through my foot [...]. My memory was attempting to use the fork to dig but 
accidentally striking my wellington boot and into my foot. However, I have no scars! [...]”). 
 Comparison with Scoboria et al. (2015) and Ost (2017). To examine whether our data 
on the reasons for belief reduction mirrored previous work, we compared our observed 
percentages with those found in Scoboria et al. (2015) and Ost (2017; see Table 5). The most 
notable result was that social feedback was the most frequently mentioned reason for why people 
changed belief. 
Table 5  
Reasons for Belief Retraction  
Reasons for Belief 
Retraction 
Scoboria et al. 
(2015) 
Ost (2017) False Memory 
Archive 
Social Feedback 53.0% (n = 198) 19.6% (n = 31) 33.5% (n = 94) 
Event Plausibility 35.0% (n = 132)   1.8% (n = 3) 23.0% (n = 66) 
Alternative attributions 30.0% (n = 108)   1.2% (n = 2)  19.6% (n = 55) 
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General beliefs 18.0% (n = 67)   0.6% (n = 1)   2.9% (n = 8) 
Internal features of 
event presentation 
16.0% (n = 61)   2.5% (n = 4)   2.1% (n = 6) 
Notion of self or others 12.0% (n = 45)   0.0%   1.4% (n = 4) 
External evidence 10.0% (n = 40) 27.2% (n = 43) 11.1% (n = 31) 
Personal motivation   4.0% (n = 16)   1.8% (n = 3)   0.4% (n = 1) 
Change of context - 12.0% (n = 19)   0.7% (n = 2) 
Noticing deterioration  -   2.5% (n = 4)   0.0% 
 
Memory Verification Strategies 
We found that 10.6% (n = 53) of the sample mentioned that they attempted to verify their 
memory. Of these people, 52.8% (n = 28) indicated trying to verify their memory by asking 
family members (e.g., “I remember meeting Elton John at a bar in New York when I was about 
8. I remember going to ask him for napkins and an autograph b[ut] I’ve asked my mother and 
she says that it never occurred. [...]”). 
Furthermore, 9.4% (n = 5) asked others (e.g., friends), 7.5% (n = 4) searched for cues 
(e.g., returning to the event location or sought out situations to cue recall, “[my memory is] being 
in China and going to visit a huge Buddha temple. The temple was impressive. Few years later I 
[visited] China. And I went to [the] place where the temple was [...].” or “I too believed I could 
fly as a small child of about 2-3.  I tried in vain to re-establish this ability until quite a bit 
older…. [...]”), 39.6% (n = 21) looked for physical evidence (e.g., photos), and 5.7% (n = 3) 
used cognitive strategies (e.g., trying to remember more of the event or engaged in reasoning 
about the event, “About thirty years ago a friend and I were climbing a mountain in Switzerland. 
[...] I recall we stayed roped since I recall thinking that I should jump to the opposite side of the 
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ridge if [my companion] slipped - he was leading. [I think we stayed roped] because these days 
it might seem prudent to unrope as then only one might fall but there is still debate over this - 
current thinking has influenced his memory. I am certain that my recollection is the correct 
one”). The percentages do not add up to 100% because some submissions included more than 
one verification strategy. 
 We also examined whether the use of memory verification strategies differed between 
believed and nonbelieved memories. We found that in reports categorized as nonbelieved 
memories, memory verification strategies were mentioned statistically more frequently (n = 40) 
than in those categorized as believed memories (n =12; c2 (1) = 10.18, p = .001, Cramer’s V = 
0.15).   
Comparison with Wade and Garry (2005) We compared our data with previous 
memory verification work (Wade & Garry, 2005; see Table 6). An important observation was 
that in our data and Wade and Garry’s (2005) paper, asking family members was the most 
frequently mentioned strategy. Furthermore, looking for physical evidence was a seldom used 
strategy in Wade and Garry’s (2005) work while we found that it was often mentioned in the 
false memory submissions.  
 
Table 6  
Memory Verification Strategies 
Verification Strategies Wade and 
Garry (2005) 
False Memory 
Archive 
Asking family member 56.7% (n = 20) 52.8% (n = 28) 
Asking others 15.0% (n = 5)  9.4% (n = 5) 
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Looking for cues   3.0% (n = 1)  7.5% (n = 4) 
Looking for physical evidence   3.0% (n = 1) 39.6% (n = 21) 
Using cognitive strategies 28.0% (n = 10)  5.7% (n = 3) 
 
Discussion 
 We analyzed reports submitted to the False Memory Archive to examine why people 
reduced belief in memories and the strategies that they used to verify them. We found that many 
archival reports could be classified as NBMs. Furthermore, social feedback was provided as the 
main reason for why people viewed their memory as being false and relying on family members 
to validate the memory was the most common verification strategy. 
The instruction to submit a false memory led many people to submit a NBM. Of course, 
NBMs are believed to be ‘false memories’ by the person possessing the memory, although these 
memories might actually refer to either false or truly experienced events. The fact that they are 
aware that the memory is false might have resulted in people reducing or surrendering belief that 
the remembered event took place despite retaining a sense of recollection for the event. 
Nonetheless, a large percentage of the remaining reports were classified as believed memories 
(41.6%) which might be regarded as surprising in a source of reports that people provide about 
false memories. Thus, although people who submitted these reports assumed that their memory 
was false, their reports indicated there was still a strong belief that the event took place. Perhaps 
these memories were actually NBMs, but because submitters were not asked specifically to 
provide reasons for why their memory was false, they did not mention them. The consequence is 
that these reports “look” like believed memories due to the language that people chose to use 
when describing them (Otgaar et al., 2013). Although these findings might be considered 
surprising, they fit well with previous research on different types of NBMs (Scoboria et al., 
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2017). In that research, people sometimes have NBMs they still largely believe, but are only 
modestly unsure about (i.e., “grain of doubt” NBMs).  
 Alternatively, the high percentage of believed memories in this archive may be linked to 
cognitive dissonance theory. Here, when there is disagreement between different sources of 
information, people attempt to resolve the discrepancy (Festinger, 1957). This can transpire in 
several ways (Scoboria et al., 2014). First, people might distrust their memory leading to the 
formation of a NBM. Second, they might reject the contradictory information thereby defending 
their memory (see also Scoboria, Otgaar, & Mazzoni, in press; Sheen, Kemp, & Rubin, 2001). 
Third, they might decide to appraise the remembered event as less important, independently of 
whether they revise the belief that the event occurred.  
 Regarding the reasons that people noted to reduce belief, social feedback was the most 
often reported reason. This is in line with previous research by Scoboria et al. (2015) and Ost 
(2017). Interestingly, when comparing the percentages of our study with those reported in 
Scoboria and colleagues’ and Ost’s study (see Table 5), our results are most in line with Scoboria 
et al.’s study (2017). That is, in Ost’s study, external evidence was mentioned relatively more 
often than in our study and in Scoboria et al.’s study. Of course, the explanation for this finding 
is that Ost’s sample concerned highly serious and negative events (i.e., sexual abuse). Ost 
explained that in his sample, retractors encountered external evidence in the form of, for 
example, newspaper articles that were critical about the experiences that the retractors reported. 
Similarly, event plausibility was rarely mentioned in Ost’s study while this was frequently 
reported in our study and in Scoboria et al’s study. Here too, this might be related to the fact that 
in our and in Scoboria et al.’s samples, certain stories were highly bizarre and hence, implausible 
(e.g., memories of flying). In Ost’s sample, statements were predominantly about traumatic 
events (sexual abuse) that are much more plausible than some of the stories of our and Scoboria 
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et al.’s work. Likewise, in our study, we found substantial evidence that submitters searched for 
physical evidence to verify their memories while this was minimally mentioned in Wade and 
Garry (2005)’s study. One plausible explanation for this result might be the context of the 
different studies. That is, the submissions in our study were part of an art project in which 
submitters were exposed to physical sources such as photos and videos related to false memory 
creation which might have triggered submitters to mention physical evidence in their statements.  
 Regarding people’s attempts to verify their memories, people preferred to use more 
cheap-and-easy strategies (i.e., asking their family members) than strategies that required more 
investment of time and/or energy (e.g., asking people other than family, searching for physical 
evidence). Moreover, NBMs were more likely to contain memory verification strategies than 
were believed memories. Perhaps people tried to verify the authenticity of the memory causing 
them to reduce belief in the occurrence of the memory. For example, people might have asked 
one of their family members to validate a memory and when this member suggested that the 
memory was false, people might have altered belief for the remembered event.  
Findings concerning the reasons for relinquishing belief and verification strategies 
broadly fit within the source monitoring framework (Nash, Wade, Garry, & Adelman, 2017). 
Source monitoring, in part, refers to the processes that people use to differentiate between events 
that truly happened from events that were, for example, imagined (Johnson, Hastroudi, & 
Lindsay, 1993). Work in this area has focused on mental heuristics such as the qualities of 
memories (e.g., strength of visual details) that are frequently diagnostic of experienced events 
(e.g., D’Argembeau, van der Linden, d’Acremont, & Mayers, 2006; Destun & Kuiper, 1999; 
Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 1988). The work reported here relates to a systematic form of 
source monitoring in which people might actively search for evidence (e.g., memory 
NONBELIEVED MEMORIES 
 
 
27 
verification) for the authenticity of their mental representations. Because of this search, people 
may come to reappraise their mental representation as false which might lead to NBMs.  
Blank (2017) suggests that there are many different examples of dissociations of belief 
and recollection. For example, déjà vu can be considered a phenomenon where people have a 
sense of recognition accompanied by a feeling that this sense is inaccurate (Brown, 2003). 
Another example is a state of memory distrust in which people lack confidence in their own 
experienced events which has sometimes been linked with the occurrence of false confessions 
(Gudjonsson, 2014; Van Bergen, Jelicic, & Merckelbach, 2009).  According to Blank, these 
recollection-belief dissociations show that before people stop believing in their recollections, 
they first go through a “reality check” that may include seeking evidence that a memory reflects 
an accurate representation of what happened. When such reality checks fail, dissociations 
between recollection and belief might occur. Perhaps the NBMs in archival accounts analyzed 
here were the result of such failed reality checks.  
Although the archive does not contain any demographic data concerning the submitters 
(e.g., age, gender), we do know that the archive concerns submissions from the general 
population. On the one hand, the archive may therefore be more diverse than previous studies 
focusing on college students or MTurk participants who are provided compensation (Mazzoni et 
al., 2010; Scoboria et al., 2015) and hence may be more generalizable to real-words settings. On 
the other hand, demographic data on people visiting museums show that they are largely white 
and well-educated but do seem to be quite equally divided among different age groups.  
A limitation of the current experiment is that although substantial agreement was found 
between different raters, this agreement might have been higher when using a shorter scoring 
form. That is, in the current study, raters used an extensive scoring form which might have made 
the scoring of submissions challenging. Of course, even with this detailed scoring form, our 
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results are in line with previous results in this area (e.g., Scoboria et al., 2015). Nevertheless, 
future research might attempt to use shorter and perhaps more simple scoring forms. Second, in 
the current study, people who submitted a false memory account received little guidance on what 
they should exactly report. The likely consequence of this is that the submissions varied much in 
content. In previous work on the reporting of nonbelieved memories, participants received more 
guidance on the events that occurred in their childhood. For example, participants were 
specifically asked to think about events from their childhood and had to insert a short description 
of each event which could serve as memory cue of the event (Scoboria & Talarico, 2013). 
In sum, the current study focused on reports from the False Memory Archive. Many of 
these reports were judged to be NBMs. Submitters described that social feedback led them to 
believe that their memory was false and that they often approached family members to verify 
their memory. This study emphasizes the flexibility that exists in autobiographical belief and 
supports the view that autobiographical belief and recollection reflect distinct underlying 
processes (Scoboria et al., 2014). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
References 
NONBELIEVED MEMORIES 
 
 
29 
Clark, A., Nash, R. A., Fincham, G., & Mazzoni, G. (2012). Disowned recollections: Denying 
true experiences undermines belief in autobiographical events. PLoS One, 7, 1-7 e32998. 
Blank, H. (2017). Recollection, belief and metacognition: A reality check. Memory, 25, 869-875.  
Brédart, S., & Bouffier, M. (2016). Nonbelieved memories in middle-aged and older people. 
Consciousness and Cognition, 42, 352-357. 
Brown, A. S. (2003). A review of the déjà vu experience. Psychological Bulletin, 129, 394-413.  
D’Argembeau, A., Van der Linden, M., d’Acremont, M., Mayers, I. (2006). Phenomenal 
characteristics of autobiographical memories for social and non-social events in social 
phobia. Memory, 14, 637-47. 
Destun, L. M. & Kuiper, N. A.  (1999). Phenomenal characteristics associated with real and 
imagined events: The effects of valence and absorption. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 
13, 175-186. 
Farrell, B., & Medvedeva, M. (2010). Demographic transformation and the future of museums. 
The AAM Press, American Association of Museums.  
Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Foley, M.A. (2017). Reflecting on how we remember the personal past: Missing components in 
the study of memory appraisal and theoretical applications. Memory, 26, 634-652. 
Gudjonsson, G. (2014). How I got started: From memory distrust to false confessions. Applied 
Cognitive Psychology, 28, 809-811.  
Johnson, M. K., Foley, M. A., Suengas, A. G., & Raye, C. L. (1988). Phenomenal characteristcis 
of memories for perceived and imagined autobiographical events. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: General, 117, 371-376. 
Johnson, M. K., Hashtroudi, S., & Lindsay, S. (1993). Source monitoring. Psychological 
Bulletin, 114, 3-28. 
NONBELIEVED MEMORIES 
 
 
30 
Landis, J.R., & Koch, G.G. (1977). The measurement of observer agreement for categorical data. 
Biometrics, 33, 159-174. 
Maran, M. (2010). My lie: A true story of false memory. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. 
 
Mazzoni, G., Clark, A., & Nash, R. A. (2014). Disowned recollections: Denying true experiences 
undermines belief in. Acta Psychologica, 145, 139-146. 
Mazzoni, G., Scoboria, A., & Harvey, L. (2010). Non-believed memories. Psychological 
Science, 21, 1334-1340. 
Nash, R. A., Wade, K. A., Garry, M., & Adelman, J. (2017). A robust preference for cheap-and-
easy strategies over reliable strategies when verifying personal memories.  Memory, 25, 
890-899. doi: 10.1080/09658211.2016.1214280 
Ost, J. (2017). Adults' retractions of childhood sexual abuse allegations: high stakes and the 
(in)validation of recollection. Memory, 1-10.  
Otgaar, H., Scoboria, A., Howe, M.L., Moldoveanu, G., & Smeets, T. (2016). Challenging 
memories in children and adults using an imagination inflation procedure. Psychology of 
Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice, 3, 270-283. 
Otgaar, H., Scoboria, A., & Mazzoni, G. (2014). On the existence and implications of 
nonbelieved memories. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 23, 349-354. 
Otgaar, H., Scoboria, A., & Smeets, T. (2013). Experimentally evoking non-believed memories 
for childhood events. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, & 
Cognition, 39, 717-730.  
Scoboria, A., Boucher, C., & Mazzoni, G. (2015). Reasons for withdrawing belief in vivid 
autbiographical memories. Memory, 23, 545-562.  
NONBELIEVED MEMORIES 
 
 
31 
Scoboria, A., Jackson, D. L., Talarico, J., Hanczakowski, M., Wysman, L., & Mazzoni, G. 
(2014). The role of belief in occurrence within autobiographical memory. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: General, 143, 1242-1258. 
Scoboria, A., Mazzoni, G., & Boucher, C. (2016). Nonbelieved memories: A review of findings 
and theoretical implications. In R. A. Nash, & J. Ost, False and distorted memories. 
online: psychology press.  
Scoboria, A., Nash, R. A., & Mazzoni, G. (2017). Sub-types of nonbelieved memories reveal 
differential outcomes of challenges to memories. Memory, 25, 876-889.  
Scoboria, A., Otgaar, H., & Mazzoni, G. (2018). Defending and reducing belief in memories: An 
experimental laboratory analogue. Memory & Cognition, 1-17. DOI: 10.3758/s13421-
018-0800-1 
Scoboria, A., & Talarico, J. M. (2013). Indirect cueing elicits distinct types of autobiographical 
event representations. Consciousness and Cognition, 22, 1495-1509. 
Scoboria, A., Wade, K. A., Lindsay, D. S., Azad, T., Strange, D., Ost, J., & Hyman, I. (2017). A 
mega-analysis of memory reports from eight peer-reviewed false memory implantation 
studies. Memory, 1-18. 
Statista. (2019). Share of adults who visited a museum or gallery in the last year in England from 
2012/13 to 2017/18, by age. Retrieved from 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/418323/museum-galery-attendance-uk-england-by-
age/  
Sheen, M., Kemp, S., & Rubin, D. (2001). Twins dispute memory ownership: A new false 
memory phenomenon. Memory & Cognition, 26, 779-788. 
NONBELIEVED MEMORIES 
 
 
32 
Van Bergen, S., Jelicic, M., & Merckelbach, H. L. G. J. (2009). Are subjective memory 
problems related to suggestibility, compliance, false memories, and objective memory 
performance? The American Journal of Psychology, 122, 249-257. 
Wade, K., & Garry, M. (2005). Strategies for verifying false autobiographical memories. The 
American Journal of Psychology, 118, 587-602. 
Wade, K. A., Nash, R. A., & Garry, M. (2014). People consider reliability and cost when 
verifying their autobiographical memories. Acta Psychologica, 146, 28-34 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
View publication stats
